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§76-3-203(2), Utah Code Annotated 
Felony conviction -- Increase of sentence if firearm used 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for 
a term at not less than one year nor more than 15 years, but 
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; 
§76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated 
Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon 
as defined in §76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another, 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be 
considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if 
it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
§76-8-1001, Utah Code Annotated 
Habitual criminal — Determination 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and 
committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses 
having been at least a felony of the second degree or a 
crime which, if committed within this state would have been 
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a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of 
second degree, and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second degree 
committed in this state, other than murder in the first or 
second degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years to life. 
§76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated 
Possession of a dangerous weapon -- Persons not permitted to 
have -- Provisions for aliens -- Penalties 
(l)(a) Any person who is not either a citizen of the 
United States or a lawfully admitted alien whose business, 
occupation, or duties require the use of a dangerous weapon; 
or any person who has been convicted of any crime of 
violence under the laws of the United States, the state, or 
any other state, government, or country, or who is addicted 
to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has been declared 
mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession 
or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in this part. The Department of Public Safety shall 
adopt rules governing the issuance and use of special 
hunting permits for lawfully admitted aliens. 
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm or sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for 
a felony or is incarcerated in a correctional facility may 
not have in his possession or under his custody or control 
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of 
a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm, explosive, or infernal machine he is guilty of a 
second degree felony. 
iv 
Rule 11 (5) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or 
no contest, and may not accept the plea until the court has 
found: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented by 
counsel, he has knowingly waived his right to counsel 
and does not desire counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the 
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what 
agreement has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAHf : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA, : Case No. 900264-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by §78-2A-3(2)(f), 
Utah Code Annotated. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
"appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a First Degree Felony." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in accepting defendant's guilty plea 
by failing to comply with Rule 11(5)(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure which requires the court to review defendant's 
constitutional rights? 
Did the trial court likewise fail to advise defendant, as 
required by Rule 11 (5) (e), that the sentence for the Firearm 
Enhancement could be imposed consecutively with the sentence for 
the Attempted Aggravated Robbery? 
Did the trial court fail to advise defendant, as required by 
Rule 11(5)(e) that his sentence for Attempted Aggravated Robbery 
1 
plus Firearm Enhancement could be run consecutively with the 
sentence he was already serving? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged, by Amended Information filed on 
December 29, 1987, with three (3) counts: Aggravated Robbery, a 
First Degree Felony, in violation of §76-6-302, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended); Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by 
a Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of §76-
10-503, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended); and under the 
Habitual Criminal provisions of §76-8-1001, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended). (R. 19-21.) Defendant waived his right to 
Preliminary Hearing with the State's consent. On January 14, 
1988, defendant was bound over to the Third Judicial District 
Court for trial. (R. 4.) 
On March 21, 1988, defendant moved to withdraw his 
previously entered plea of not guilty in exchange for reduced 
charges. (T. 3/21/88, p. 1.) According to the plea bargain 
agreement, defendant would plead guilty to Attempted Aggravated 
Robbery, a Second Degree Felony with Firearm Enhancement, and, in 
exchange, the State would move to dismiss Counts II and III of 
the Information. (T. 3/21/88, p. 1.) The trial court accepted 
defendant's guilty plea to Attempted Aggravated Robbery and 
dismissed Counts II and III. (T. 3/21/88, p. 4.) 
After entering his plea, defendant waived the two (2) 
2 
day minimum time for sentencing and was sentenced immediately. 
(T. 3/21/88, p. 5.) The State recommended that defendant serve a 
term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years consecutively to the 
sentence he was already serving. Additionally, the State argued 
for an additional sentence of one (1) year for Use of a Firearm, 
pursuant to §76-3-203(2). (T.3/21/88, p. 5-6.) Defendant 
requested that he serve a term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years 
concurrently with his previous commitment. (T. 3/21/88, p. 4.) 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one 
(1) to fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison to be served 
consecutively with defendant's previous commitment. 
(T. 3/21/88, p. 9.) The trial court also sentenced defendant to 
an additional term of one (1) year as enhancement for the use of 
a firearm to be served consecutively with the other two (2) 
sentences. (T 3/21/88, p. 9.) 
Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on 
August 7, 1989. (R. 41.) Defendant's original counsel moved to 
withdraw and the Third Judicial District Court granted the 
motion. (R. 37-40.) New counsel was appointed for defendant. 
On February 2, 1990, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon heard 
defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Defendant argued 
that the court should allow him to withdraw his plea because the 
trial court failed to comply with Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. (T. 2/2/90, p. 25.) Specifically, defendant 
argued that he had not been advised of his constitutional rights 
3 
and did not understand that the firearm count could be imposed 
consecutively with his other sentences. (T. 2/2/90, p. 42-43.) 
Defendant also argued that his guilty plea was involuntary 
because the court failed to advise him that he might be required 
to serve his new sentence consecutively with the sentence he was 
already serving. (T. 2/2/90, p. 25.) 
In response, the State asserted that defendant signed 
an affidavit before entering his plea which enumerated 
defendant's constitutional rights as required by Rule 11(5) (c). 
(T. 2/2/90, p. 48.) The affidavit also stated that defendant's 
sentence was subject to enhancement for the use of a firearm. 
(T. 2/2/90, p. 30.) The State argued that this notice of 
enhancement in the affidavit complied with the requirement in 
Rule 11(5) (e) that defendant know of "the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences." (T. 2/2/90, p. 29-30.) 
The State also argued that the court was not required to advise 
defendant that his sentence may run consecutively with his 
previous commitment. (T. 2/2/90, p. 31-32.) 
The lower court denied defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea. The lower court held that defendant's affidavit 
sufficiently advised him of his constitutional rights; that 
defendant understood, by the word "enhancement," that his firearm 
sentence could be imposed consecutively; and that the court was 
not required to inform him that his new sentence could be imposed 
consecutively with the sentence he was already serving. (T. 
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2/2/90, p. 49-57.) See also (R. 55-57). On May 17, 1990, 
counsel for defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 58.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Due to the fact that this case was not tried, there is 
no other evidence to cite in support of a statement of the facts. 
Additional facts concerning the trial court are presented in the 
Argument section of this Brief, as those facts relate to the 
issues raised. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.d 1309 (Utah, 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court adopted a strict compliance standard in 
accepting a defendant's guilty plea. It held that the trial 
court must strictly comply with Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure by making an on-the-record showing that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under the 
Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court also held that the use of a 
written affidavit cannot alone achieve compliance with Rule 
11(5). The trial court must personally apprise the defendant of 
his rights on the record prior to the entry of the guilty plea 
before a knowing and voluntary plea may be entered. 
In State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App., 1989), 
the Utah Court of Appeals held that compliance with Rule 11(5) 
mandates that a defendant be advised of his specific 
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constitutional rights: The right against self-incrimination, to 
a jury, to appeal, and to confront witnesses. The Court of 
Appeals also held that Rule 11(5) mandates that a defendant be 
informed of the maximum possible sentence for the offense, 
including the possibility of consecutive sentences. In State v. 
Smith, 777 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the defendant must be "unequivocally and clearly 
informed about the sentence that would be imposed." 
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to advise 
defendant of his specific constitutional rights. The trial court 
also failed to clearly and unequivocally advise defendant that 
his firearm enhancement and the sentence he was already serving 
might be imposed consecutively. Therefore, the trial court 
failed to comply with Rule 11(5) and defendant should be allowed 
to withdraw his guilty plea. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
STRICT STANDARDS OF RULE 11(5) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN ACCEPTING 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides, in pertinent part: 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial, and to confront and 
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cross-examine witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea, he waives all 
of those rights;... 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed 
upon him for each offense to which a 
plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences;... 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah, 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court held: "Rule 11(5) (e) squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 
11(5) (e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered." .Id. at 1312. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial court 
may not rely on a written affidavit to ensure that these 
requirements are met. "The use of a sufficient affidavit can 
promote efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the starting 
point, not an end point, in the pleading process." 740 P.2d at 
1313. The Court imposed an affirmative duty on the part of the 
trial judge to review the affidavit with the defendant. "The 
trial judge should then review the statements in the affidavit 
with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his 
understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed 
by §77-35-11 on the record before accepting the guilty plea." 
740 P.2d at 1314. 
In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court abandoned the former 
"record as a whole" test. See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 
(Utah, 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah, 1985); 
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Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah, 1989). (Guilty plea 
entered before Utah Supreme Court decided Gibbons). 
Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals has followed the 
strict compliance standard of Gibbons, In State v. Valencia, 776 
P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989), the Court held "[s]trict, and 
not just substantial, compliance with [Rule 11(5)] is required." 
Similarly, in State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
(1990), the Utah Court of Appeals considered the voluntariness of 
defendant's guilty plea and the trial court's compliance with 
2 Rule 11(5). It held that the trial court could not just rely 
on defendant's written affidavit to ensure that the plea was 
voluntary and in compliance with Rule 11(5). 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 37. 
Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals held in 
Valencia that the examination of the defendant regarding his 
affidavit "should be sufficiently detailed and extensive to 
provide a factual basis to conclude from defendant's responses 
that his decision was knowing and voluntary." 776 P.2d at 1335. 
State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 
1988), "when a new rule of criminal procedure constitutes a clear 
break with the past, it will not be applied retroactively." 
2 . . 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently upheld its decision 
in Pharris that a trial court must strictly comply with Rule 11 
in accepting a guilty plea. See State v. Maguire, Case No. 
900045-CA (filed 11/16/90). 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENUMERATE 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN 
ACCEPTING HIS PLEA 
In determining whether defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, the trial court 
asked the following: 
THE COURT: You understand that you have 
certain rights under the constitution and if 
you plead guilty here today, that you are 
waiving those rights 
MR QUINTANA: Yes 
(T. 3/21/88, p. 1-2) 
The trial courtfs inquiry failed to comply with the 
strict requirements of Rule 11(5). In Valencia, the Court of 
Appeals held that general questions regarding a defendant's 
constitutional rights are insufficient. "Specific inquiry should 
be made as to whether defendant understands that by his plea he 
waives his rights against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, to 
appeal, and to confront witnesses." [Emphasis added.] 776 P.2d 
at 1335. 
Likewise, in Pharris, the Court of Appeals held: 
[T]he trial court did not as required by Rule 
11 (5) (c) inform defendant at the time the plea was 
taken that he waived his constitutional right 
against self-incrimination by pleading guilty to 
the offense. The State argues that this 
information is included in the affidavit. 
However, inclusion in the affidavit alone is not 
sufficient to ensure that the defendant's 
constitutional rights are protected. 143 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 37. 
Because the trial court failed to make a specific 
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inquiry regarding defendant's constitutional rights as required 
by Rule 11 (5) , defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADVISE 
DEFENDANT THAT HE COULD BE SENTENCED 
CONSECUTIVELY FOR FIREARM ENHANCEMENT 
The trial court failed to inform defendant that he 
might have to serve a consecutive sentence for the use of a 
firearm. Because defendant was not properly informed, his guilty 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. The trial court advised the 
defendant as follows: 
THE COURT: You also understand that there 
could be an enhancement of zero to five years 
because you used a firearm or a gun at the time of 
the attempted robbery 
MR QUINTANA: Yes 
(T. 3/21/88, p. 3) 
Never did the trial court make a specific inquiry into 
whether defendant knew that enhancement meant a possibility of 
consecutive sentences. The language of Rule 11(5) (e) is clear. 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or 
no contest, and may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed 
upon him for each offense to which a 
plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences. [Emphasis 
added.] 
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah, 1988), the 
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Utah Supreme Court made it clear that a trial court must show on 
the record that a defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary. 
[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the plea 
is entered for the defendant's understanding of 
the nature of the charge against him." McCarthy, 
394 U.S. at 470, ...We think the most effective 
way to do this is to have a defendant state in his 
own words his understanding of the offense and the 
action which make him guilty of the offense. 
Id. at 1273. 
In State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah, 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that adequate knowledge is crucial for a plea 
to be voluntary: "[t]he record must show that [defendant] was 
unequivocally and clearly informed about the sentence that would 
be imposed." [Emphasis added.] J^ d. at 466. 
In the instant case, defendant was not unequivocally 
and clearly informed that his firearm enhancement might be 
imposed consecutively. While the lower court did inform 
defendant of the enhancement charge, the record does not show 
that defendant understood that it could be imposed consecutively. 
The failure to clearly inform defendant that enhancement might 
mean imposition of a consecutive sentence rendered his plea 
unknowing and involuntary. 
Likewise in Vasilacopulos, the Utah Court of Appeals 
rejected the State's contention that the trial court adequately 
informed the defendant of the possibility of consecutive 
sentences. In that case, the Court examined the trial court's 
inadequate phraseology under the weaker "record as a whole test" 
11 
and concluded: 
The record as a whole supports a conclusion that 
defendant would only be subject to consecutive 
sentences under certain conditions. Paragraph 7 
of defendant's affidavit states, flI also know that 
if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting 
sentencing upon another offense of which I have 
been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed on me. 756 
P.2d at 95. 
From this statement, the Court concluded that "[t]he 
record as a whole did not affirmatively establish defendant's 
full knowledge and understanding of the consequences of his plea 
under Rule 11 (5) (e) ."3 
C. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADVISE 
DEFENDANT THAT HE COULD BE SENTENCED 
CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE SENTENCE HE WAS 
ALREADY SERVING 
As previously noted, under Smith, the trial court is 
required to show that a defendant is unequivocally and clearly 
informed about the sentence which might be imposed. Smith, 777 
P.2d at 466. In the case at bar, defendant was never informed 
that he might have to serve his sentence consecutively with the 
sentence he was already serving. (T. 3/21/88, p. 1-4) 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 39 n.12, also rejected an inadequately phrased warning of 
defendant's allowable sentence. In Pharris, the defendant's 
allowable sentence was listed as: "Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5" under 
notation: "Crime, Degree, Punishment." However, the Court 
specifically noted that the listing did not contain "years" 
following "0-5." 
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Therefore, the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11(5) which 
mandates that the defendant be informed "of the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences." Rule 11(5)(e) Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant asks this Court to remand this case to the 
trial court with an order to allow defendant to withdraw his 
previously entered guilty plea. 
*]£: RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED^this />_ daY o f January, 1991. 
IE L. MOWER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this __/S_.-_ day of January, 
1991, I caused to be delivered four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the attorney for the 
plaintiff/appellee herein, Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
(Affidavit of Defendant, March 21, 1988) 
I n t h ^ D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e T h i r d •It icllclift It*9'lartoPl«r-
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff 
s\ vs* 
MAR z 1 1988 
H Dixon rtjpitoj, ~.z, • „*j List Court 
Affidavit of Defendant 
Criminal No. 
Defendant 
, under oath, hereby acknowledge that 1 have entered a plea of 
guilty to the charge(s) of' 
(Name of Crime) / 
Facts: Elements 
CLZJPJ^UU-WKY\: h-ujc^ • y JLSS^S 
\ have received a copy of the aharge (Information)^md understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
:gree of Ft (De 
and understand the punishment for this crime may be 
# prison term 
elony or Class off Misdemeanor) 
fine, or both. I am not on druisjoralcohol. 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney 
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them. 
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if l wish to have a trial I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have m> witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if l choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that l have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless l choose 
to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
proceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
1. 1 also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which 1 have been 
mnvirt^i A n r tr» t t / k l ^ k I !•*•«»» — I - - J — . - ' I * 
or sen ience 01 impri sonment upon me a n a n o promises nave been made t o m e by a n y o n e as t o what the sentence will ~ 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)): 
will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. 1 have read this Affidavit, or 1 have had it read to me by my attorney, and 1 know and understand its contents. 1 
.years of age, have attended school through the. ..and I can read and am 
Dated this 
understand the English language. 
day of. S?K^*Jl 1 9 ^ 
-z? 
Subscribed and syoin to feehpre me in Court this. 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
a © * 
Defendant 
t&^&U'^cU By 
D«ruti>Ct«?rk 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
Judge 
1 certify that I am the attorney for , the defendant named above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in th^ foregoing^Affid^it are in all respects accurate and true. 
Defense Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
1 certify that 1 am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against ^ - g c ^ ^ ^ U ^ T ^ S ? — - > , defendant. 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered.^~ % ^&~ -<r"'-2^2, yy 
Done in Court this U-L day of S/Z^^^C^^
 % l9< 
/n 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
f J District Judge * 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA 
Defendant. 
Transcript of: 
Disposition 
(Pages 1-9) 
Defendant's Motion 
to withdraw 
Guilty Plea 
(Pages 10-20/21-59) 
Case No. CR88-127 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Monday, March 
21, 1988. 
APPEARANCES 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
KAREN KNIGHT-EAGAN 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FRANCES PALACIOS 
Attorney at Law 
623 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1998 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: This is the time set for 
4 disposition in the case of State of Utah vs. Quintana 
5 CR88-127. This time was set for disposition. What is 
6 the status of this case? 
7 MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, today we are 
8 prepared to move to withdraw our previously entered plea 
9 of not guilty to count 1 of the Information and enter a 
10 plea to an Attempted Aggravated Robbery, which would 
11 constitute a second degree felony, keeping in that felony 
12 the enhancement provisions of the aggravation. 
13 J In exchange for that plea, the State would move 
14 to dismiss count 2 and I believe count 3, in the amended 
15 information, is the habitual criminal and also move to 
16 dismiss that count as well. 
17 MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: That is correct, Your Honor. 
18 I would move to dismiss count 1 to reflect the charge of 
19 Attempted Aggravated Robbery, second degree felony, but 
20 remain included in that paragraph is the firearm 
21 enhancement. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Quintana,. have you discussed 
23 this with your attorney? 
24 MR. QUINTANA: Yes, I have. 
25 THE COURT: You understand you have certain 
1 rights under the constitution and if you plead guilty 
2 here today, that you are waiving those rights? 
3 MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: An affidavit has been prepared and 
5 have you read that affidavit? 
6 MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: Have you reviewed that with your 
8 attorney? 
9 MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: Were there any words or phrases or 
11 sentences in the affidavit you did not understand? 
12 MR. QUINTANA: No. 
13 THE COURT: Are you under the influence at the 
14 present time of any drugs or medication that would impair 
15 your good judgment? 
16 MR. QUINTANA: No. 
17 THE COURT: Would you go ahead, please, and 
18 sign your affidavit. 
19 MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Your Honor, I have signed 
20 it. 
21 MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, I have signed it on 
22 behalf of Mr. Quintana and Karen Knight-Eagan has signed 
23 it on behalf of the State. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Quintana, for one to be found 
25 guilty of Attempted Aggravated Robbery or to plead guilty 
1 J to that crime, one has to have attempted by force or fear 
2 J to take the property from another person and to do so 
3 with a deadly weapon, in this case a gun. You understand 
4 those to be the elements of the crime? 
5 MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: This affidavit says that you 
7 attempted to take property from an employee of the Magic 
8 Store and you did so with the use of a gun; is that what 
9 happened? 
10 MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: And is that why you are going to 
12 plead guilty here today to Attempted Aggravated Robbery? 
13 MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: You understand that this particular 
15 crime to which you will be pleading is a second degree 
16 felony and carries a possible sentence in the State 
17 Prison of one to fifteen years? 
18 MR. QUINTANA: Yes, I do. 
19 THE COURT: You also understand that there 
20 could be an enhancement of zero to five years because you 
21 used a firearm or a gun at the time of the attempted 
22 aggravated robbery? 
23 MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: Have any promises or threats been 
25 made to you to induce you to make this guilty plea today? 
MR. QUINTANA: No. 
THE COURT: Knowing all that we have talked 
about, is it still your desire to plead guilty to this 
particular crime? 
MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
THE COURT: To the crime, then, to count 1 of 
the amended Information as amended, Attempted Aggravated 
Robbery, a second degree felony, do you plead guilty or 
not guilty? 
MR. QUINTANA: Guilty. 
THE COURT: The Court finds that the defendant 
has freely and voluntarily made a guilty plea to count 1 
as amended and accepts that guilty plea. And do I have a 
motion as to counts 2 and 3? 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: We move to dismiss, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: The said counts are hereby 
dismissed. What about a date for sentencing? 
MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, I have discussed 
this matter with Mr. Quintana and I suppose I would ask 
the Court to consider allowing Mr. Quintana to be 
sentenced today and allow the sentence with respect to 
the one to fifteen, to run concurrently with what he is 
serving. I do have some background information. 
THE COURT: First of all, let's just consider 
4 
whether or not we should sentence today. 
Mr. Quintana, by statute in this State, I am 
not supposed to sentence you for at least two days from 
today and within 30 days. However, this is something 
that you can waive, if you want. If you desire to be 
sentenced today, you do so without the benefit of a 
Presentence Report and we can do that. That is something 
you have to agree to. Do you, in fact, agree to that? 
MR. QUINTANA: I might as well do it today. 
THE COURT: Do you, in fact, then waive the 
statutory right you have not to be sentenced within two 
days of taking the plea? 
MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Does the State have a 
recommendation at this time? 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Your Honor, it would seem 
appropriate since Mr. Quintana is already at the prison 
to commit him for the additional one to fifteen-year 
term. The State's request is going to be that that run 
consecutively to his present commitment since it is an 
entirely separate criminal episode and crime. 
In addition, the sentencing on the enhancement 
is covered in 76-2-302 (sub. 2) it requires a minimum 
sentence to add a consecutive year. 
THE COURT: As for the enhancement zero to 
5 
five? 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: The minimum required by the 
statute would be one year consecutively. It allows the 
Court to provide for an indeterminate zero to five and 
run it consecutively. 
MS. PALACIOS: I have a copy for the Court, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: When it comes to enhancement, do I 
do that zero to five like any indeterminate sentence, or 
do I choose a number of years between zero to five? 
MS. PALACIOS: My understanding, the Court 
makes at least a one-year sentence. But after that the 
Court may make it for more. We would request the Court 
to impose the one-year statutory time since it does need 
to run consecutively. 
If I can give the Court some background with 
respect to Mr. Quintana, Mr. Quintana has a 1971 burglary 
conviction. It shows as a second degree felony, however, 
the reports that I have gathered and Mr. Quintana tells 
me that was a burglary of a drug store. It was at night. 
At that time a burglary at night was considered a second 
degree. So, it was not a burglary of a dwelling. He has 
two other prior convictions for burglary and a theft 
which is zero to five, which occurred at the same time 
which nas to do with the burglary and theft from a drug 
6 
1 I store. And that basically, Your Honor, explains 
2 | Mr. Quintana's situation. 
3 | He has had a longstanding drug problem. While 
4 I committing this particular offense, he was under the 
5 influence of alcohol and drugs. And in a review of the 
6 police report, it is quite clear that Mr. Quintana was so 
7 intoxicated that he didn't know what he was doing. We 
8 are not saying there was no legal responsibility. He did 
9 such a terrible job, he did this robbery while he was 
10 wearing a hat that said "Daryl" on it. He barely left 
11 the place and the police picked him up. This is not 
12 something he does plan out and does well. It was a 
13 result of a need for his drugs, he became involved. 
14 Because of that, when he returns to the prison 
15 we are going to ask the Parole Board to consider some 
16 treatment for him before he is released. He was paroled 
17 in 1973 and remained out until 1985, and I think that 
18 indicates there is a long period of time that he was on 
19 I the street where he could perform the drugs that overcame 
20 him again. 
21 Mr. Quintana, while the record reflects a 
22 number of DUI's, does not have a history of robberies or 
23 assaultive-type crimes as this, and Mr. Quintana has 
24 I indicated to me he is real concerned because he did 
25 commit this type of crime and this is not something that 
he, as a person, who is not intoxicated, would have even 
considered doing. 
We will ask the Court to consider he is before 
the Board now on two zero to fives. If the Court intends 
to run this consecutively, we would ask the Court to also 
consider to only sentence him on the one year for the 
enhancement. 
You have anything you want to add? 
MR. QUINTANA: You have said it all. 
THE COURT: Anything from the State? 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Nothing additional, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Were you on parole at the time of 
this crime? 
MR. QUINTANA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is there any legal reason why 
sentence should not be imposed at this time? 
MS. PALACIOS: No legal reason, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Quintana, the Court is always 
concerned about parolees, who commit crimes while on 
parole, and what to do with them when they commit a 
crime. Because if one gets out of the prison on parole, 
he is supposed to be on his best behavior. If he commits 
other crimes and go back and the sentence is concurrent 
again, what is the real incentive to go straight and to 
8 
obey the law? That is the first problem we have. 
The second thing, with this case we are always 
concerned about guns that are used. According to the 
Information, the manager, whoever was there at the store, 
was ordered to lie on the floor and the terrifying 
thought was going through their minds of whether or not 
they are going to be shot and killed any minute, because 
it is in the paper everyday and those few moments of 
absolute terror for people are things that a Judge has to 
also take into consideration. I think this is a case 
that I have to make the sentence consecutive, and I am 
going to do that. 
It is the judgment and sentence of this Court 
that you, Jose Quintana, be sentenced to a term of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the crime of 
Attempted Aggravated Robbery. That sentence is to run 
consecutively to any sentence you are presently serving 
in that prison. And in addition to that, I am sentencing 
you to an enhancement of one year for attempting to 
commit this crime with the use of a firearm. That 
enhancement of one year will likewise be consecutive and 
commitment forthwith. 
(End of hearing.) 
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REPORTER«S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) S 3 . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, DOROTHY L. TRIPP, C.S.R., do hereby 
certify: 
That I am one of the Official Court Reporters 
of the Third District Court of the State of Utah. 
That on Monday, March 21, 1988, I reported 
the testimony and proceedings, to the best of my 
ability on said date in the above-entitled matter, 
presided over by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah; and that the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 
9, inclusive, contain a full, true and correct account 
of said proceedings of Quintana Disposition to the best 
of my understanding, skill and ability on said date. 
O i 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 0 3 day 
of October, 1990. 
Dorothy L. Tripp, C.S. 
Official Codrt Reported 
License No. 00074-1801-8 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA 
Defendant.. 
Transcript of: 
Defendant's Motion 
to withdraw 
Guilty Plea 
(Pages 10-20) 
Case No. CR88-127 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Tuesday, 
January 30, 1990. 
APPEARANCES 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
BARBARA BYRNE 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CONNIE L. MOWER 
Attorney at Law 
623 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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1 TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1990 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: This is the time for hearing in 
4 State of Utah vs. Quintana, CR88-127. Would you identify 
5 yourselves and who you are representing. 
6 VOICE: Your Honor, Connie Mower with the 
7 defendant who is present. 
8 J VOICE: Barbara Byrne representing the State. 
9 THE COURT: And the record should show the 
10 defendant is present here in court and this is the 
11 defense's motion. And you may proceed. 
12 MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, before the defense 
13 proceeds with the motion, Ms. Mower has shown me her 
14 delivery of the notice of .this and I wouldn't question 
15 for a moment that she sent notice of this. I did not 
16 receive notice of it until yesterday afternoon at 4:00. 
17 This morning I have received a copy of the transcript, 
18 the copy of the affidavit and copy of the cases. The 
19 State is not prepared to argue this at this time. Our 
20 notice came from the Court yesterday afternoon and that 
21 is the first we had heard of it. So I would ask that it 
22 be continued for the State to have an opportunity to 
23 prepare argument on it. 
24 THE COURT: Ms. Mower. 
25 MS. MOWER: Your Honor, back in August of 1989 
11 
when I was first appointed to represent Mr. Quintana, I 
filed in open court, I believe, his Motion to Withdraw 
his Guilty Plea subject to being noticed up once we had 
received the transcript of the change of plea that was 
had before Your Honor back in March of 1988. I did make 
a request for that transcript and received it towards the 
end of October and subsequently noticed up this hearing 
after doing the research on the matter. 
I filed back in December a Notice of Hearing. 
My copy which is conformed, it is not an exact copy, 
shows that I signed it on December the 14th and that such 
a copy of this was mailed to the County Attorney's Office 
back in December. We are prepared today and ready to 
proceed on the issues. 
The argument today will be as to issues as a 
matter of law whether or not the Court should permit 
withdrawal of his guilty plea based upon the record as it 
currently exists. We are prepared to proceed and we 
believe we have given notice. 
THE COURT: Well, I will give you some time, 
Ms. Byrne, to look over — Have you read the transcript? 
MS. BYRNE: No, Your Honor, as I said, I just 
received the transcript this morning which Ms. Mower was 
polite to provide to me. I have been in Judge Rigtrup's 
court in a Pretrial Conference since that time and have 
12 
1 not had a opportunity to read through it. 
2 THE COURT: I will proceed with this hearing at 
3 this time. Let you make your arguments at this time and 
4 see where we stand on it and grant you additional time if 
5 necessary, Ms. Byrne, to make a further response if I 
6 have to continue the hearing; but he is here from the 
7 prison, and we might as well. 
8 It would appear from the file that notice was 
9 given in December of this hearing. That's more than 30 
10 days away and there is a mailing certificate. If it got 
11 lost someplace, we confront that once in awhile. I think 
12 at this point I have no choice but to proceed and you may 
13 proceed. 
14 MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, just for the record, I 
15 am not questioning that Ms. Mower sent it. I am merely 
16 J stating that in point of strict fact I never got it. 
17 That is the point I want to make. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MS. MOWER: Your Honor, before I proceed with 
20 my argument today, I would like to hand the Court the 
21 original of the transcript which was prepared by your 
22 Court Reporter, if I may approach. And further, I would 
23 give the Court a copy of Rule 11 as it currently appears 
24 in the cocoa version of the Utah Code and I will make an 
25 explanation because there is some new language in there. 
13 
In addition to that, I will give the Court copies of the 
Gibbons and Vasilacopulos cases. 
THE COURT: Let me read this transcript. If 
you had given it to me earlier, I would have had it read 
before now. 
MS. MOWER: I should have, because I was here 
earlier. 
(Pause) 
THE COURT: Okay, I have read the transcript of 
the sentencing hearing that occurred on March 21, 1988. 
MS. MOWER: That includes the change of plea. 
THE COURT: That's with the change of plea. I 
meant the change of plea, right. 
MS. MOWER: I have also brought with me today a 
copy of Rule 11 and the Gibbons and Vasilacopulos cases, 
which I believe are dispositive. 
(Pause) 
THE COURT: Okay, I have read. Ms. Byrne, have 
you read this authority that she has handed to the Court? 
I know you are on a short leash here. 
MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, unfortunately I am not 
quite as fast as you are. I am still struggling through 
the transcript. 
THE COURT: Go ahead and read the transcript. 
(Pause) 
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What I am going to do at this point is just 
take an informal recess and allow Ms. Byrne, so she 
doesn't feel rushed, to read the transcript and this case 
authority and we will see where we stand at that point. 
As I indicated, the State has indicated they don't 
question that notice was probably given, but she has not 
received notice and she is not really prepared to go 
forward and that is unfair on one side or the other for 
the Court to rule with that being the case. If she feels 
satisfied arguing this case after her review of the 
transcript and this authority, then we'll go ahead and 
argue it today. If she doesn't, then we will just 
continue this hearing until tomorrow or whatever. 
MS. BYRNE: Tomorrow would be fine. 
THE COURT: I can fit you in tomorrow morning 
again. 
MS. MOWER: I have a jury in West Valley, Your 
Honor, beginning at 9:00. It will be a day and a half. 
MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, I think if I have a few 
minutes to read this over, I can probably respond in a 
defensive manner, I guess, to what counsel has presented. 
I am, however, aware of other case law on this copy but 
not being Kent Morgan, I cannot cite the Court the names 
or citations. 
THE COURT: You don't look like Kent Morgan. 
15 
MS. BYRNE: I am one of those that keep fact 
situations in my head and occasionally holdings, but I 
can't do names or cites. It is not part of my 
repertoire. 
THE COURT: Let me ask, Ms. Mower, at this 
point, is it your position that the defendant was not 
advised that the sentence could be a consecutive 
sentence? 
MS. MOWER: Yes, there are two critical 
problems with the transcript. The first issue is with 
regard to the waiver of rights, and a question whether 
the Court complied with Rule 11(e) in making sure on the 
record the defendant knew or understood his various 
rights which he waived, those rights which, of course, 
are contained in the affidavit. That is question No. 1. 
Question No. 2, was whether the Court properly 
advised him that there would be a consecutive sentence, 
not only to the sentence that he was currently serving 
out at the Utah State Prison, but also the gun 
enhancement. Those are the two critical issues. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, with that in mind, 
let's stand in informal recess for .about 20 minutes or 30 
or 15, whatever it takes Ms. Byrne to review. Did she 
hand you copies of these cases? 
MS. BYRNE: She did, Your Honor. I have the 
16 
two cases. 
THE COURT: Or shall we continue this? It is 
too bad you are not availabLe tomorrow morning. 
MS. MOWER: I am sorry. I can't sit on this 
case the whole time tomorrow. 
MS. BYRNE: Can I make an alternative 
suggestion, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. BYRNE: I think by 2:00 this afternoon I 
could have the cases in hand and be prepared to argue. I 
can do it by probably 11, but I have to be at roll call 
in Circuit Court. Is there any chance we can do this 
this afternoon? 
THE COURT: What is that? 
TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: Judge, I am not sure 
of the transportation. 
MS. MOWER: And, Judge, I am due in Ogden this 
afternoon at 2:00 on an Order to Show Cause calendar. 
Nov/, if that folds, I will be available. 
THE COURT: This won't take long to argue. 
This is going to be a legal matter based upon this 
transcript. Based on the transcript and the affidavit, 
it is going to be a legal argument. It shouldn't take us 
more than — 
MS. MOWER: Half hour? 
17 
THE COURT: At the most, both sides half hour. 
MS. MOWER: I am long-winded, 
MS. BYRNE: I think if I go over to Circuit 
Court, I can probably farm these cases to one of my 
teammates and say "do this for me," and I can go over to 
our library. There is one particular case that I need 
and I can be back here by 11. 
THE COURT: I don't want to rush you. We can 
fit this in Friday morning if we have to. Oh, we can't. 
THE CLERK: You can do it Friday afternoon at 
1:30. 
THE COURT: Okay, Friday afternoon at 1:30. 
MS. BYRNE: That would be fine. 
MS. MOWER: I think I am clear Friday afternoon 
and if not I guess I can make it clear. 
THE COURT: Mr. Quintana can make it, I am 
sure. I don't want to put the rush on you that fast. I 
would have preferred tomorrow morning. Ms. Mower is in 
trial. Let's go for Friday afternoon at 1:30. So we 
will simply continue this hearing now until Friday 
afternoon at 1:30 and make sure he is transported in. 
MS. MOWER: Your Honor, for the Court, I am 
aware of one other case that has been decided on the 
issue of a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea which was 
handed down, I think, in the beginning of 1989. That is 
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the Copland case. As far as I know, it doesn't apply to 
our facts. 
There is another case which I worked on an 
appeal, State of Utah vs. Kerry Ross Moore which resulted 
in no opinion being published, but simply a minute. If 
there are other cases, I would certainly be interested to 
know it. 
MS. BYRNE: As soon as I find it, I will notify 
you. 
Your Honor, one other matter for the record, 
before we adjourn. On page 4 of the transcript at line 
19, I think there may be an error. It indicates Ms. 
Knight-Eagan is speaking and telling the Court MI have 
discussed this matter with Mr. Quintana." 
THE COURT: What line, page 4? 
MS. BYRNE: Page 4, line 19. It indicates the 
speaker to be Ms. Knight-Eagan. I would suggest to the 
Court that that is probably Ms. Palacios because if that 
were a statement by Ms. Knight-Eagan suggesting that the 
sentence run concurrently — 
THE COURT: I am sure that that is a 
typographical error. I think you would agree. 
MS. MOWER: I would agree that that is probably 
Ms. Palacios speaking at this point, and the State 
wouldn't have an interest in that. It would be the 
19 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
defense at that point. 
MS. BYRNE: I would be surprised if Ms. Knight-
Eagan had been discussing the matter with Mr. Quintana 
when Ms. Palacios was there. 
THE COURT: Yes. I am just going to write on 
this copy. 
MS. MOWER: That is the original provided by 
your Court Reporter and maybe we will make that part of 
the record. 
THE COURT: Okay, then continue until — This 
incidentally, this sentencing took place prior to our 
adoption of the new statement that we have all finally 
put together, along with the County Attorney's Office and 
Public Defenders Office. It is kind of a joint effort to 
put together some sort of a statement that covered all of 
the bases. So, this does come under the old affidavit 
that was used for years and years and years. We will 
deal with this come Friday afternoon at 1:30. 
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FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 199Q 1:30 P.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is the time for hearing in the 
continued hearing of State of Utah vs. Quintana, CR88-
127. Identify yourselves and who you are representing. 
MS. BYRNE: Barbara Byrne representing the 
State. 
MS. MOWER: Connie Mower appearing with the 
defendant who is present in court. 
THE COURT: The defendant is present and we 
have held one hearing in this matter. We continued it to 
give the State an opportunity to review the authorities 
submitted by the defendant and to review the transcript 
of the hearing at the which time the plea was taken. 
Now, Ms. Mower, anything further? You may proceed, 
MS. MOWER: Thank you. Your Honor, we are here 
today on Defendant's Motion to set aside his previously 
entered plea of guilty in this case. Mr. Quintana was 
originally charged in the Information with the crimes of 
aggravated robbery, possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person, and habitual criminal, as I recall. A 
plea bargain was worked out between, the parties in this 
case and by the record it would appear that on March 21, 
1988, Mr. Quintana entered a plea of guilty to the charge 
of attempted aggravated robbery and Count 2, which would 
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have been the possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, was dismissed, as well as the habitual criminal. 
At the time the Court took Mr. Quintana's plea, the Court 
did make use of an affidavit which was the old affidavit, 
and not the one that is currently in use by the Court. 
There was some discussion on the record and I have 
provided the Court with the affidavit. But to summarize 
what occurred at the time of the taking of the plea, 
counsel stated what the plea bargain was for the record. 
The Court asked Mr. Quintana if he had discussed the plea 
bargain with his attorney and he acknowledged he had. 
You asked him if he understood that he had certain rights 
and if he pled guilty he would be waiving the rights. 
You asked him if he saw the affidavit; if he read it; if 
he understood it. "Do you have any questions about it?" 
And you further asked him if he was under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol. 
At that point the Court instructed Mr. Quintana 
to sign the affidavit entering his plea, I assume, and 
also waiving his rights under the affidavit. The Court 
then reviewed with Mr. Quintana, this is contained on 
pages 2 and 3, the elements of the offense and the 
factual basis for satisfying those elements. And Mr. 
Quintana, on the record, acknowledged that the facts did 
in fact satisfy the elements as set forth. 
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1 The critical portion of the affidavit comes up 
2 now. Beginning on page 3 of the transcript, the Court 
3 J begins to describe what is the minimum and maximum 
4 punishment that could be imposed on Mr. Quintana and the 
5 Court begins about line 14: "You understand that this 
6 particular crime to which you are pleading is a second 
7 degree felony, which carries a possible sentence in 
8 prison of 1 to 15 years? MR. QUINTANA: Yes, I do. THE 
9 COURT: You also understand there could be an enhancement 
10 of 0 to 5 years because you used a firearm or a gun at 
11 the time of the attempted robbery? MR. QUINTANA: Yes.M 
12 The Court then asks if any promises or threats 
13 had been made and then asks Mr. Quintana if he wishes 
14 still to enter a plea of guilty, which in fact he does 
15 and that is reflected on the transcript, page 4, line 10. 
16 The problem that we have with the entry of the 
17 plea, Your Honor, is that this plea was an involuntary 
18 plea and was not a knowing or intelligent plea. Based on 
19 the transcript, at the time of the taking of the plea and 
20 even taking into account the affidavit that was prepared, 
21 I there were two problems. No. 1 problem, and the most 
22 significant problem, is that the Court does not advise 
23 Mr. Quintana on the record that there is a possibility 
24 that with the aggravated robbery charge, with gun 
25 enhancement, that the Court has the option of imposing 1 
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to 15 on the aggravated robbery and consecutively an 
additional 0 to 5 on the enhancement, gun enhancement 
portion of that crime. 
It is significant in the transcript that there 
is no discussion of consecutive sentences until later on 
when the Court begins the sentencing process. And the 
first time I see it, the word even, "consecutive" comes 
in on page 5 when Ms. Knight-Eagan requests that he be 
sentenced consecutively to the case he was already on 
parole on, consecutive to the 1 to 15 aggravated robbery 
and the gun enhancement consecutive to that. That is the 
only reference in this transcript or the beginning 
reference, and I would ask the Court to note that is 
after the taking of the plea. 
The Court is aware that under Rule 11(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure that the Court is 
required, and absolutely required, to establish certain 
things on the record before the Court can accept a plea. 
And specifically in question here are in Rule 11(3)5, 
(e)5-C, and (e)5-E. The rule requires that the Court may 
refuse to take a plea of guilty or no contest and may not 
accept this plea until the Court has found (e) this 
portion: "The defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentences that may be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
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1 I the imposition of the consecutive sentence." 
2 1 So, the mistake, I would suggest to the Court, 
3 J is that the Court did not inform the defendant that the 
4 Court could impose a 1 to 15, and then a 0 to 5 
5 consecutive for the gun enhancement. 
6 I have given the Court at our last hearing 
7 copies of two cases which I think are particularly 
8 relevant, and the most significant, I guess, begins with 
9 Gibbons but before the Gibbons case came down, Your 
10 Honor, the caption was Warner — 
11 THE COURT: Well, I am familiar with the law, 
12 and that is the reason, you see, we now have — When this 
13 problem came up, we changed the statement. We call it "a 
14 statement" now that used in place of that affidavit. So 
15 J I am familiar with the law. I will give you a chance to 
16 argue that if necessary. I am interested in hearing from 
17 Ms. Byrne as to her position in this regard. Okay? 
18 MS. MOWER: I will sit down. 
19 THE COURT: Is there anything you want to say 
20 other than what the law is? 
21 MS. MOWER: Yeah, there is a second point, Your 
22 Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Oh, go ahead. 
24 MS. MOWER: With the first point, I think it is 
25 I pretty clear that on the record nowhere does it talk 
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about the consecutive sentences with respect to the gun 
enhancement; but the second point, Your Honor, I think is 
a finer question. And that is the Court in its exchange 
with the defendant before you took the plea, did not 
advise the defendant of his rights under the 
constitution. And that is contained in subparagraph C of 
Rule 11 and those are the things like his rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, right to jury trial, right 
to confront and cross examine the witnesses in open 
court. Those kinds of rights. The Court doesn't make 
reference to those. And my suggestion would be that in 
view of the fact that the legislature has seen fit to 
enumerate these particular rights which must be waived in 
open court, the Court should have made reference to them. 
I guess the question arises whether because those rights 
are talked about in the fine print of this old affidavit, 
whether that is sufficient to meet the requirement of 
this rule. And my argument would be, Your Honor, that it 
is not. I think that the affidavit can contain a number 
of things and save the Court some time in addressing some 
issues. But I believe that the requirements of Rule 
11(e) say that you need to have some kind of specific 
finding about knowing, voluntary waiver of these 
particular rights as they are contained in these 
paragraphs. That is the secondary problem. The first 
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problem is the most serious, I think, of problems. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Byrne. 
MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, there are a couple of 
points that the State would like to raise. One of them 
is that under Rule 77-13-6, which is the section on 
allowable pleas and what may be done with them, the 
section added by the legislature and made operative as of 
July of 1989, indicates that there is a 30-day limit on 
the time between when the plea is entered and the time 
there may be a motion to withdraw it. The State has a 
question as to whether this is the appropriate way to 
raise the issue or whether the appropriate way is by Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. That would be our first point. 
The second point, I trust the Court has a copy 
of the Smith case which I did bring in earlier. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. BYRNE: Under Gibbons there is an inference 
that all of the information that the defendant must be 
advised of, he must be advised of verbally by the Court, 
before he enters his plea. But in Smith, and that would 
be at page 465, the first full paragraph, there is 
certainly at least an inference there this information 
may be furnished either in the affidavit or orally by the 
Court at the time of taking the plea, rather than the 
inference that we have in Gibbons that it must all be 
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orally on the record. 
THE COURT: Where are you reading? 
MS. BYRNE: I am reading in the first full 
paragraph beginning, "It indicates before us today 
neither defendant's affidavits regarding the plea — " It 
is the first full paragraph in the first column, 465. 
There is an inference there that you have got to have it 
one place or another. You have got to have it either in 
the affidavit or in the Court's verbal instructions, 
inquiries of the defendant before he enters the plea. 
This seems to state you have got to have it one place or 
the other, but not necessarily both. 
It would be the State's position that given 
what the Court indicates in Smith, that if you have that 
information one place or the other, you are okay. It is 
a knowing and voluntary plea that would be made at that 
point. 
The federal cases that the Court relies on 
seems to indicate how concerned the Court is that the 
Judge just talks to the attorney and the attorney answers 
"Yes, I have explained this to the defendant. Yes, the 
defendant has read it." And "Yes, the defendant wants to 
enter his plea." The federal cases seem to indicate that 
their concern is that the Judge talk to the defendant. 
I would point out that in the transcript of the 
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1 hearing it seems to me that the Court had quite a bit of 
2 J conversation directly with the defendant and not through 
3 I the attorney. For example on page 1, at line 22, the 
4 Court asked directly of Mr. Quintana, "Have you discussed th 
5 with your attorney?" He says, "Yes." 
6 THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Does the 
7 affidavit or the transcript indicate that the defendant 
8 was advised that his sentence could be consecutive to any 
9 sentence he was then presently serving? Let's start with 
10 that one. 
11 MS. BYRNE: Sure. Your Honor, I believe that 
12 the Court did make that indication to the defendant and 
13 that would be on the transcript page 3, beginning at line 
14 19. The Court has already in the previous paragraph 
15 I explained that the possible sentence for the second 
16 degree felony is 1 to 15 years. Mr. Quintana indicates 
17 he understands. At line 19, the Court states, "You also 
18 J understand there could be an enhancement of 0 to 5 years 
19 because you used a firearm?" It would be the State's 
20 position that that is advice of an additional sentence. 
21 THE COURT: Well, wasn't this defendant already 
22 serving time at the State Prison? 
23 MS. BYRNE: He was, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: At the time he came before me for 
25 I sentencing on a totally different crime? 
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MS. BYRNE: He was, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I think one of the problems is 
whether or not he was advised that the sentence that I 
was going to hand down could be made to run consecutively 
and not concurrently with that term he was already 
serving. Isn't that one of your points? 
MS. MOWER: That is one of the points, yes. 
MS. BYRNE: Would the Court like me to respond 
to that? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. BYRNE: The State's response to that would 
be there is no such requirement; that the Court always 
has that option to make a new offense consecutive to the 
old offense. 
THE COURT: Does Rule 11 say I have to advise 
him it is consecutive? 
MS. BYRNE: I don't believe it does, Your 
Honor, nor does the cases. Now, in the cases of Gibbons 
and Vasilacopulos, there is language indicating for the 
Court to give the full information on consecutiveness. 
That the Court must give that information. But what they 
are talking about in those two cases are crimes that the 
plea of guilty is entered to at that time. If someone 
were to plead guilty to three offenses at the time he is 
before the Court, if the Court intended to make these 
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1 sentences consecutive on those three offenses the 
2 defendant was pleading guilty to at that time, the Court 
3 would have to inform the defendant that there was that 
4 possibility. 
5 THE COURT: Your point is that there is no 
6 obligation on the Court to advise a defendant at the time 
7 of sentencing that that sentence could be made to run 
8 consecutively to any other sentence he was already 
9 serving someplace? 
10 MS. BYRNE: That would be the State's position. 
11 I do not see the requirement in 11(e) or the cases. 
12 THE COURT: Before we leave that point, let's 
13 ask Ms. Mower. Is it your position that there was an 
14 obligation to advise him of that? 
15 MS. MOWER: I think so, in a situation where 
16 the Court is aware that the defendant is serving a 
17 sentence. 
18 THE COURT: Is there anyplace in the cases or 
19 the statutes that would require the Court to so indicate 
20 to a defendant? 
21 MS. MOWER: All the statute requires and the 
22 I rule requires is that the defendant know the minimum and 
23 maximum sentence to which a plea is entered. So nothing 
24 in the rule says that you have to do that. But I would 
25 suggest to the Court that there is a greater issue, and 
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1 that is the voluntariness or the knowingness of the 
2 I guilty plea as far as the defendant is concerned. 1 
3 think a defendant has the right to know, not under the 
4 rule, but the Boykin case and the Alford case to enter a 
5 plea knowingly and voluntarily. And I think that if the 
6 Court is aware that there is a whole other charge out 
7 there which is a current problem and the Court doesn't 
8 advise at that point "By the way, I could run this 
9 consecutive with your other charge." 
10 THE COURT: But isn't that something that is as 
11 logical as the nose on your face? That if you have 
12 J committed a crime and you are out there at prison, and 
13 then you commit another crime, any logical person would 
14 realize you don't have a right just to serve time on all 
15 of these crimes. I mean, if that were the case, why 
16 wouldn't one just feel free, whether on parole or 
17 whatever they are, to commit all the crimes they want to, 
18 they only have to serve one time and they might as well 
19 J rob 50 banks as 1. 
20 MS. MOWER: I understand the point the Court is 
21 making. The problem is that in all of the case law that 
22 talks about knowing and voluntary pleas, the emphasis is 
23 on what the defendant knows and is the defendant advised 
24 on the record. It may be perfectly logical. I think it 
25 is perfectly logical that everybody would understand that 
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1 there is a right to jury trial. I mean, why do we have 
2 to mention that again in open court? We all live in this 
3 society, but there is a requirement of, even though it is 
4 generally known. The question isn't whether it is 
5 commonly known. The question is, is it something that 
6 will affect the voluntariness of the plea on that 
7 question? 
8 THE COURT: Okay, anything else on that, Ms. 
9 Byrne? 
10 MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, in response to Ms. 
11 J Mower's point, it seems to me that the legislature had 
12 the opportunity to include that as part of Rule 11 and 
13 J did not do so and the Supreme Court of Utah had the 
14 opportunity to make that requirement in any one of these 
15 J three cases that counsel and I have mentioned, but did 
16 I not do so. 
17 THE COURT: What rule is that? 
18 MS. BYRNE: That is 77-35-11, is one of them. 
19 The other one I have mentioned is 77-13-6. 
20 THE COURT: Well, 77-35-11 says that one of 
21 those things is "that the defendant knows the minimum and 
22 J maximum sentence that may be imposed on him for each 
23 I offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
24 possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences." 
25 Is this the rule that was applicable at that time of 
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1 sentencing? This isn't new. This is the same old rule, 
2 isn't it? 
3 MS. BYRNE: It is, Your Honor. That same 
4 information is enumerated in State vs. Gibbons which is 
5 the case that caused the restructuring of the affidavits 
6 and the admonitions. 
7 THE COURT: Shouldn't he have been advised then 
8 that his plea of guilty in this case could cause a 
9 sentence that would be consecutive to his other sentence? 
10 MS. BYRNE: Well, Your Honor, it would be the 
11 State's position that the legislature did not make that a 
12 requirement and we — 
13 THE COURT: What do you mean? It just says 
14 here "advise him of consecutive sentences." 
15 MS. BYRNE: That is true, Your Honor, but it 
16 seems to me you would have to read that together with the 
17 rest of the first part of the sentence which is that the 
18 defendant knows the minimum and maximum that may be 
19 imposed upon for each offense to which a plea is entered. 
20 Not having to do with any previous pleas or sentences. I 
21 believe that applies only to the pleas entered at the 
22 J time of the entry of the plea. And the cases that 
23 interpret Gibbons and Vasilacopulds and Smith, all talk 
24 about the case where the defendant enters a plea of 
25 guilty to more than one charge at that particular time. 
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1 I And so that in the cases they say he must be advised that 
2 I he can get consecutive sentences for those pleas entered 
3 I at that time. 
4 I THE COURT: That goes without saying and in 
5 those cases were any of those defendants already serving 
6 time? 
7 MS. BYRNE: No, Your Honor, they were not. 
8 THE COURT: So that issue did not come up? 
9 MS. BYRNE: No, it did not. 
10 THE COURT: Anything else on this one point? 
11 MS. BYRNE: Nothing beyond what I have said. 
12 THE COURT: The second point was what, the 
13 enhancement? 
14 MS. MOWER: The enhancement with the attempted 
15 aggravated robbery. 
16 THE COURT: That he was not advised of the — 
17 MS. MOWER: Consecutive. That the Court can 
18 impose consecutive sentences on that. 
19 THE COURT: On that because of the firearm 
20 enhancement. 
21 MS. MOWER: Right. 
22 THE COURT: Ms. Byrne, that is the next 
23 argument. 
24 MS. BYRNE: Okay. I would have two points to 
25 make on that, Your Honor. One is that I believe the 
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Court did make that clear before the plea was taken on 
page 3 of the transcript, beginning at line 19, when the 
Court says, "You also understand that there could be an 
enhancement of 0 to 5 years because you used a firearm?" 
Mr. Quintana says, "Yes." And it would be the State's 
position that that is advising the defendant that there 
could be additional time served. That is what 
enhancement means. 
Also under State vs. Schroedder, the Court 
indicates that no other notice is required of the 
enhancement other than just indicating in the charge in 
the Information that a firearm was used. 
THE COURT: What about that? 
MS. MOWER: Your Honor, I would simply say that 
the Court, in spite of this language, the Court does not 
tell Mr. Quintana on the record that the 0 to 5 that is 
contained at line 19 and thereafter could be run 
consecutively to the 1 to 15 on the principal charge; an 
enhancement could possibly be an additional 0 to 5 
concurrent. How is the defendant to know what — 
THE COURT: How could that be an enhancement? 
The whole object of enhancement is if someone commits a 
crime, they have to pay a punishment. But if they commit 
that crime with a gun, then the punishment is going to be 
greater. That is the whole object of enhancement. 
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I I MS. MOWER: I understand that, Your Honor. 
2 J However, enhancement can be either at — You understand, 
3 J we have indeterminate sentences. It can either be at the 
4 one of the 1 to 15 years, or it could be at the 15 
5 portion. And it makes a dramatic difference if you 
6 advise somebody that it could run consecutive as opposed 
7 to adding additional time, say, making it a 2 to 16, as 
8 it may have been interpreted in this case. It is not 
9 clear. And the point is under Smith, and I think this is 
10 where the Smith case helps us, is that the Court says you 
11 have to be absolutely clear with unambiguous language 
12 I what the sentence could be. And in Smith, of course, 
13 I they were talking about mandatory sentences. With an 
14 enhancement, what we are talking about, the firearm 
15 I enhancement, we are talking about a mandatory sentence. 
16 The problem we have is that the Court did not use 
17 unambiguous terms. It was not clearly unambiguous. It 
18 J is confusing and it would have been very simple to say 
19 the word "consecutive," and unfortunately that word does 
20 not appear before the changing of plea. 
21 MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, under the section 
22 dealing with firearm enhancement, 76-3-203, unless it is 
23 a third degree felony that is being pled to, it is not an 
24 option that it run concurrent. It has to be consecutive. 
25 THE COURT: Well, her point, it doesn't matter 
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what has to be or shouldn't be. Her point is he has to 
have been advised. 
MS. BYRNE: And my second point and the main 
point would be that the manner — Enhancement, as the 
Court properly states, means more. If something is 
enhanced, that means there is more of it; not less and 
not at the same level. And I would submit that when the 
Court uses at line 19, page 3, the language, "You also 
understand," when the Court has already said, "for a 
second degree, you get 1 to 15, and then also in line 
19, "you also understand if it be an enhancement of 0 to 
5 because you used a firearm." 
It would be the State's point that by using the 
language you used the word "also," that indicates 
additional, not the same, and the word "enhancement" 
means more. And I think there is no requirement that the 
Court state unequivocally that it must be consecutive. 
Merely that that information be imparted. Whether it is 
imparted using the word "consecutive" or not. It does 
not say in the cases that that particular word must be 
used. 
Again, I think that the qoncern in the federal 
cases and I presume since the state court is also citing 
those same cases, the Court's concern is that the Judge 
have a conversation with the defendant, not just with the 
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1 I defendant's attorney. And in this instance, the Court 
2 certainly did that. 
3 I MS. MOWER: And I would respond to that. Your 
4 I Honor, by reminding the Court of the Vasilacopulos case. 
5 I understand it is not directly on point and, in fact, it 
6 is pre-Gibbons case. The fact of the matter was in 
7 Vasilacopulos, the Court of Appeals said, "If you are 
8 going to impose consecutive sentences, you have got to 
9 use the word 'consecutive,' otherwise it is a violation 
10 of Rule 11." You have got to do that. And unless there 
11 is something on the record where you can see that the 
12 defendant is advised that it is consecutive, you haven't 
13 advised him and he is entitled to withdraw his plea of 
14 guilty. Again, Rule 11(e) and under Gibbons, we have 
15 strict compliance. Strict compliance. That is the 
16 standard and when there is an error or the record is not 
17 clear, and the Court hasn't strictly complied, the Court 
18 must allow the defendant to withdraw his plea, 
19 MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, may I inquire where in 
20 Vasilacopulos the Court states you must use the word 
21 "consecutive"? 
22 MS. MOWER: Page 95, left column, middle of the 
23 page. "The trial Court clearly failed to find 
24 defendant understood the possibility of consecutive 
25 sentences. The State argues the record as a whole 
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affirmatively establishes defendant's full 
awareness of such a possibility. We disagree." And it 
goes on to say that the only thing contained in this 
particular record was a record in the affidavit which 
didn't apply to his circumstance. 
MS. BYRNE: May I respond to that, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. BYRNE: Your Honor, looking at 
Vasilacopulos at page 95 in the section cited by counsel, 
it states there that the only record evidence that the 
Court apprised the defendant of the possibility of 
consecutive sentences in this case, was the Presentence 
Report and recommendation submitted at the sentencing 
hearing. That would be in this case. We have an awful 
lot more than that on our record in the case under 
consideration. 
I would submit that the Court in the 
Vasilacopulos case, that the Court must advise the 
defendant that there is the possibility of consecutive 
sentences. It does not say that the Court must use the 
language: "I may sentence you to consecutive terms." 
That is not required under this case or any other or the 
statute that that word be used; and I think that looking 
again at the transcript on page 3, lines lg through 22, I 
think the Court did advise him. And the Court further 
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1 inquires, "Do you understand that?" And Mr. Quintana, at 
2 line 23, says, "Yes." And, you know, short of giving a 
3 defendant a psychological examination after every 
4 question the Court asks, I don't know how much clearer it 
5 could be. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Have we covered now the 
7 points, Ms. Mower? 
8 MS. MOWER: No. Your Honor, the final point 
9 I was the rights that are specifically enumerated in Rule 
10 ll(e)3. Defendant knows he has a right against self-
11 incrimination, to a jury trial, to confront and cross 
12 examine in open court the witnesses against him, and by 
13 entering the plea he waives all of those rights. There 
14 was no discussion on the record about that. 
15 THE COURT: And you are saying that although 
16 the affidavit clearly states those rights and I asked him 
17 if he had reviewed that affidavit and did so with 
18 J counsel, and understood all of the terms, that that is 
19 I not enough? 
20 MS. MOWER: Yeah. It is my position that 
21 I because Rule 11(3) specifically talks about those rights, 
22 that the Court is required to inquire upon the record 
23 about those. I think, as I said before, an affidavit can 
24 contain a lot of language and a lot of information for a 
25 defendant, which may satisfy other requirements. But 
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11(e) requires something affirmative. 
I would point out to the Court that especially 
in a case like this where there was the old affidavit, I 
don't think by asking a defendant, "Did you read the 
affidavit and did you understand it," that that meets the 
requirement of establishing on the record that the 
defendant do. You don't know. The Court can't make a 
finding about knowing unless the Court inquires. People 
every day think that they understand and say they 
understand, when they have no idea what they are talking 
about. And in order for the Court to find out, the Court 
has to test the knowledge of the defendant. 
THE COURT: But he had standing beside him was 
Ms. Palacios. 
MS. MOWER: True. 
THE COURT: A very competent criminal lawyer, 
with long experience. Heard all of these questions. 
MS. MOWER: True, and I have no question — 
THE COURT: Would you Just let me finish. I 
let you finish. Can I finish? Who stood beside him and 
heard me ask him, "Have you reviewed this with counsel 
and do you understand all of the terms," and so forth. 
And he said, "Yes." And the affidavit is very clear and 
lays out those in simple, concise, what I believe almost 
is easier to understand language than the new statement 
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through anyway so we might as well junk the statement? 
MS. MOWER: As a matter of fact, Gibbons says 
that an affidavit is to be a starting point and not an 
ending point. The Court is required to review the 
information contained on the affidavit with the 
defendant. And further, the Copland case — I'm sorry I 
didn't provide that — affirms that notion. You need to 
review that with the defendant. You must test his 
understanding. We don't permit people simply on their 
say-so in this society. We don't accept somebody's 
representation that they understand. In school, how do 
you test understanding? You take a test. 
THE COURT: Why do we need defense lawyers 
anymore? Why don't you leave them out of the picture 
totally if they are useless? They are worthless, if your 
theory is true. They are here in court to represent the 
rights of clients and to make sure he understands or she 
understands. If what you say is true, there is no need 
for lawyers anymore. Let's just let each individual come 
in before the Court and I have to make sure I have to 
become a lawyer for that person. 
MS. MOWER: That is right. 
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1 THE COURT: That is what you are saying? 
2 MS. MOWER: That is right. If the Utah Supreme 
3 Court places that obligation on you in Gibbons and 
4 Vasilacopulos, it is the duty of the trial judge to make 
I is 
5 sure that this/on the record and that there are specific 
6 findings, and they say it is just simply not enough. 
7 Attorneys make mistakes. Attorneys assume they 
8 communicate perfectly with their clients, and they don't. 
9 THE COURT: Now, does your client understand 
10 that if we do allow him to withdraw his plea, all the 
11 charges are reinstated and we start from scratch, all 
12 counts? 
13 MS. MOWER: Let me ask him. Do you understand 
14 that, Mr. Quintana, that if this plea is withdrawn, you 
15 go back to facing charges of a first degree felony, 
16 aggravated robbery, possession of a firearm by a 
17 restricted person, and habitual criminal? 
18 MR. QUINTANA: Yes. Now — never mind. 
19 THE COURT: Well, go ahead if you want to talk 
20 J to your lawyer, but I want you to fully understand that. 
21 I I haven't made up my mind yet. 
22 MR. QUINTANA: Can I say something? 
23 THE COURT: You better ask your attorney if you 
24 can say something. 
25 MS. MOWER: Your Honor, perhaps we can take a 
46 
few moments. 
THE COURT: Let's take a five-minute recess. 
Is that enough time? 
MS. MOWER: Yes. 
(A brief recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: Okay, anything further? 
MS. MOWER: Yes, Your Honor. After talking to 
my client during the brief recess, my client has asked me 
to move the Court to request an additional form of 
relief. It would be his preference rather if the Court 
had the alternative of granting him his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea and starting afresh at trial, 
his actual preference would be that the Court amend his 
sentence to reflect concurrent, where the Court feels 
that the. Court imposed a consecutive sentence without 
advising him. 
THE COURT: I won't do that. There is only one 
motion here and that is to withdraw the plea. I will 
either grant it or deny it. And if I deny it, then I 
suppose your next step would be to the Supreme Court. If 
I grant the motion, then the plea is withdrawn and we 
step back exactly to where we were just before the plea 
was taken. All charges again would appear, the three 
different counts, and then we would set a trial date and 
proceed. That is where we really are on this thing. 
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1 MS. MOWER: In that case, we would like a 
2 ruling on our motion. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
4 MS. BYRNE: Yes, Your Honor. For the record, 
5 before the Court makes its judgment on this, I would like 
6 to note that in the affidavit it clearly states each of 
7 the constitutional rights that the defendant gives up, 
8 including the right to trial, to have the State present 
9 witnesses and prove each and every element, and all other 
10 constitutional rights. That is in the affidavit. I 
11 would also point out that the Court does not inquire just 
12 of counsel if the defendant understands his rights. The 
13 Court inquires of the defendant and that, I believe, is 
14 the main thrust of the federal cases, that the Court and 
15 the defendant have a colloquy. If you cannot trust what 
16 the defendant says when he says, "I do understand my 
17 rights. There are no words or phrases in the affidavit 
18 that I do not understand." Then I think we are opening 
19 the door to chaos because there would be no way that the 
20 Court could trust anything that the defendant said he 
21 I understood. 
22 The State would submit it with that. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Did you have anything else? 
24 I You get the last word. 
25 MS. MOWER: I would just simply point out to 
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the Court that when we all applied to be admitted into 
the bar, we felt as though we understood, after three 
years of law school, what the law said. The Bar 
Association and the Supreme Court don't take our word for 
it after clear study that we understand. They force us 
to take a test to make sure we do truly understand. I 
think that no less is required of the Court to make sure 
that a non-law educated defendant has a proper 
understanding of what is going to be imposed upon him. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: At the time the plea was taken, an 
affidavit was presented signed by the defendant, and that 
was on March 21, 1988. And in that affidavit he 
indicates — it is indicated that he had read the 
affidavit or had it read to him by his lawyer; that he 
knew and understood its contents; and that he could read 
and understand the English language. And in that 
affidavit all of his constitutional rights were set forth 
and the defendant in this statement that he had signed, 
it is indicated that he was represented by Frances 
Palacios who explained all of his rights to him and that 
he understood such rights. And those rights are also set 
forth in that affidavit. 
Doesn't that affidavit further state that he 
understood the punishment for this crime? Maybe 1 to 15 
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1 years, plus enhancement, 0 to 5. And that is in the 
2 affidavit. 
3 And also part of the certificate is the 
4 certificate of the defense lawyer, Frances Palacios, 
5 where that states and I quote, "I certify that I am the 
6 attorney for Jose Quintana, the defendant above-named, 
7 and I know he has read the affidavit or that I have read 
8 it to him, and I discussed it with him, and believe he 
9 fully understands the meaning of its contents, and is 
10 mentally and physically competent. To the best of my 
11 knowledge and belief, the statements and representations 
12 and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
13 affidavit, are in all respects accurate and true." 
14 There is additional information contained in 
15 this affidavit and the document stands for itself, 
16 including a certificate of the prosecuting attorney. 
17 Now, the Court did not rest on that affidavit 
18 J alone or the face of it alone, but had a personal 
19 exchange with the defendant at the time of sentencing and 
20 the transcript of the hearing indicates that the Court 
21 asked Mr. Quintana if he had discussed this matter with 
22 his attorney and he said, yes, he had. And I asked him 
23 at that time, "Do you understand you have certain rights 
24 under the constitution, and if you plead guilty here 
25 today that you are waiving those rights?" And he 
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indicated, yes, he did understand that. I asked him if 
he had read the affidavit and the answer was yes. I 
asked him if he had reviewed the affidavit with his 
attorney and his answer was yes. I asked him if there 
were any words or phrases or sentences in the affidavit 
that he did not understand and he said no. I asked him 
if he was under the influence at the present time of any 
drugs or medication that would impair his good judgment. 
His answer was no and then at that point I asked him if 
he would then — "Would you go ahead and sign your 
affidavit." 
The transcript also indicates that I instructed 
Mr. Quintana as to the elements of the crime and then 
asked him — I instructed him what the elements were and 
asked him if he understood those elements and his answer 
was yes. And I reiterated what his affidavit said, that 
he had attempted to take property from an employee of 
Magic Store and did so with the use of a gun. I asked 
him if that is what happened and he said yes. I asked 
him if that is why he was going to plea guilty to 
attempted aggravated robbery and he said yes. I asked 
him if he understood that this particular — and these 
are my words: "This particular crime to which you will 
be pleading is a second degree felony and carries a 
possible sentence in the State Prison from 1 to 15 
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1 I years." His answer was, "Yes, I do." And then I asked 
2 I the following: "You also understand there could be an 
3 J enhancement of 0 to 5 years because you used a firearm or 
4 gun at the time of the attempted aggravated robbery?" 
5 And Mr. Quintana answered, "Yes." There are some other 
6 matters that are referred to in this transcript and there 
7 was a discussion in the hearing in which the prosecutor 
8 indicated that Mr. Quintana was already at the prison and 
9 the State requested that the sentence be consecutive to 
10 his then present commitment since it was an entirely 
11 separate criminal episode of a crime, and there is a 
12 further discussion as to enhancement and so forth. 
13 With that in mind, I believe that he waived the 
14 waiting period for being already in the prison. He 
15 waived the mandatory two-day waiting period for 
16 sentencing, and requested immediate sentencing. And 
17 therefore, then there was an exchange as to what the 
18 sentence would be and his lawyer made an argument and 
19 gave some background information, and with that exchange 
20 there was the usual discussion that takes place at the 
21 time of sentencing and he was sentenced to consecutive 
22 J terms. 
23 The Court found at that time and so stated in 
24 the transcript that based upon all of the foregoing in 
25 the affidavit, that the defendant had made a voluntary 
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and knowledgeable plea and the issues before the Court 
now simply go to whether or not he was advised orally or 
advised sufficiently. 
The Court finds in addition to the 
constitutional rights, that the affidavit, in addition to 
the exchange that took place between the Judge and the 
defendant, in the presence of his attorney, and the 
certificate of the attorney, that he understood the 
contents of the affidavit and that he had read it or she 
had read it to him and they had discussed it. And in 
addition to the defendant having said he had read and 
reviewed that affidavit, and also had discussed it with 
his attorney, and that in that affidavit the affidavit is 
clear enough with all of this exchange that he fully and 
truly understood the rights that he had and that the 
rights that he was waiving, the constitutional rights at 
the time the plea was taken. 
As to the enhancement, the affidavit clearly 
says that the defendant understood the punishment may be 
1 to 15 years, plus enhancement, 0 to 5. And there was a 
discussion on the record of enhancement and the Judge 
specifically indicated during the hearing, asked the 
defendant if he understood that there could be an 
enhancement of 0 to 5 years. And the very word 
"enhancement" indicates something in addition to. And 
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the way the affidavit is worded, and that exchange, the 
Court would find he understood that. 
It leaves the third point. The third point 
being that Mr. Quintana at the time of sentencing in this 
case was already incarcerated in the Utah State Prison 
for a crime totally unrelated to this, I believe. I 
don't know. I can't say that with authority. I assume 
totally unrelated to this, but he was already an inmate 
there. And I would have to review — We would have to go 
back to the Presentence Report because my memory doesn't 
serve me whether or not the crime in this case was while 
he was out on parole, which my best memory is that it 
was, but I could be mistaken. Or whether this crime or 
that crime was committed separately and he just happened 
to end up at prison before this one got tried. My memory 
serves me that he was on parole from the State Prison at 
the time he committed this crime and that parole had been 
revoked and he returned to the State Prison and therefore 
was now serving that time for that original crime when 
this one came up for sentencing. If I am in error, I 
would stand corrected if someone here knows and could 
direct me in that regard; but that is my best memory. 
MS. BYRNE 
THE COURT 
MS. BYRNE 
I have that information. 
Am I accurate? 
Your Honor, I have a certified copy 
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of a previous conviction that was had before Judge Rokich 
on August 20, 1985, in which the defendant was also 
represented by counsel. And those affidavits would 
indicate that at the time of the commission of the 
offense and the discussion here, he was on parole from 
the Utah State Prison for the felonies which he either 
pled or was convicted by Judge Rokich. If the Court 
would like, I could present the document to be made a 
part of the record. 
THE COURT: Was he on parole when he was 
sentenced, or do you know? 
MS. BYRNE: That is the indication I have, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: But anyway, it is clear he was at 
the State Prison when it was time for sentencing on this 
case. 
His attorney during the hearing says — states 
that — asks the Court because of his history and 
problems if — she says, "If the Court intends to run 
this consecutively, we would ask the Court to also 
consider to only sentence him on the one year for the 
enhancement." And she asked Mr. Quintana then, "Do you 
have anything to add?" And he said: "You have said it 
all." 
I asked him if he was on parole at the time of 
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1 J this crime and Mr. Quintana said yes. So he was on 
2 J parole at the time of this crime. 
3 I did not advise him, according to this 
4 transcript, that the sentence could be consecutive with 
5 the crime for which he was already serving in the State 
6 Prison and the affidavit does not. The Vasilacopulos 
7 case and the other cases deal with defendants with 
8 multiple counts and the necessity of the Court to advise 
9 the defendant when one makes a plea to multiple counts 
10 that each count carries a sentence and each one can be 
11 consecutive, one with another. I do not know of a case 
12 in Utah that deals with the issue of where one has been 
13 out on parole, commits a crime and, in fact, his parole 
14 is revoked and he is back in prison. And then he goes to 
15 trial for the crime he committed while on parole or makes 
16 a plea, whatever the case may be, whether he has to be 
17 advised that that sentence would be consecutive to the 
18 one already being served in the State Prison. 
19 I am finding that such is not necessary because 
20 it should go without saying that if one is in prison, is 
21 I put out on parole and commits a crime while on parole, 
22 and his parole is revoked and he is back serving his 
23 original time, that any punishments for crimes committed 
24 I while out on parole are going to be added to whatever he 
25 I is serving while in the prison. I don't think that a 
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defendant in such a circumstance needs to be advised of 
that. It would be illogical and almost ludicrous to 
think that one, while on parole could commit crimes 
without any additional punishment. Otherwise, parolees 
all the time they would have nothing to risk except just 
the original time they were serving and there would be no 
real inducement to go straight on the outside. 
I am making a finding that — holding, I guess, 
not a finding. I am really making a holding then that in 
this type of a situation, there is no necessity to advise 
the defendant that his new crime is going to have a 
punishment that could be consecutive to the time already 
being spent in the prison and for the reasons I have 
already stated. I think I have covered all three points. 
Have I? 
MS. MOWER: Yes, you have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that being the case, I will 
deny the defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Plea. 
MS. MOWER: Your Honor, we need an additional 
finding if the Court can help us. The Court has made 
reference in its ruling today to information which came 
after the taking of the plea. For example, in this case, 
the Court took his plea first and then there was a 
sentencing hearing after the taking of the plea. The 
Court has referred to — 
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1 I THE COURT: Well, I don't think that is 
2 | necessary for the holding that I have made. I think I 
3 | have made it very clear what my holding is, regardless of 
4 I what was said at sentencing. The only reason it just may 
5 have some added impact, if you want to say that in this 
6 case, is the fact that the plea was taken and sentencing 
7 done all the same time in the same hearing with his 
8 attorney present in which therefore at that very same 
9 time a discussion was made concerning hoped the sentence 
10 J wouldn't be consecutive or not. It may have just 
11 happened two or three minutes after the plea was taken. 
12 But it is all taken there all basically there at the same 
13 time, which I don't think it is necessary, but would seem 
14 to indicate that it was pretty clear in the mind of the 
15 defendant and his attorney that that certainly was a 
16 possibility, or it wouldn't have been brought up at that 
17 moment. Okay, that being the case, you may prepare the 
18 I findings and my order. 
19 MS. BYRNE: Thank you, Your Honor. I will do 
20 that. While we are still on the record, I would note 
21 that as I believe I pointed out in my argument 
22 previously, that there is also an advice of the possible 
23 enhancement on firearm before the defendant enters his 
24 plea and that would be on the transcript at page 3, lines 
25 lg to 22. 
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THE COURT: I thought I referred to that. 
MS. BYRNE: You may well have, Your Honor, but 
counsel asked about it only happening subsequent to the 
taking of the plea, inclined me to mention that one more 
time. 
THE COURT: I think she had reference to the 
consecutive. 
MS. MOWER: The first mentioning of the word 
"consecutively" was post taking. 
MS. BYRNE: Okay, just as long as we are 
talking about that word. 
THE COURT: I did say the record does not 
indicate that in the affidavit or the transcript itself, 
that before the plea he was advised that this sentence 
could be consecutive to the one he is already serving. 
That is the reason I went to such great lengths to give 
my reasoning why I don't think that was necessary. The 
other argument as to enhancement, that clearly — the 
affidavit not only says 1 to 15 years, plus enhancement, 
but there was also an exchange on the record. So that 
one is clear that he knew of that. But as for the other, 
that is the one issue that I really had to rule on and 
state the reasoning for that. 1 And, Ms. Byrne, if you 
would prepare the appropriate — make the findings as I 
have basically said them so there is a record on that. 
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